Cryptography, Passwords, Privacy, and the Fifth Amendment by Kessler, Gary C. & Phillips, Ann M.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 15 Article 2 
August 2020 
Cryptography, Passwords, Privacy, and the Fifth Amendment 
Gary C. Kessler 
Gary Kessler Associates / Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach, kessleg1@erau.edu 
Ann M. Phillips 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach, ann.phillips@erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, 
Information Security Commons, Law and Society Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and 
Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kessler, Gary C. and Phillips, Ann M. (2020) "Cryptography, Passwords, Privacy, and the Fifth Amendment," 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 15 , Article 2. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2020.1678 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol15/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Cryptography JDFSL V15N3
CRYPTOGRAPHY, PASSWORDS,
PRIVACY,AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Gary C. Kessler1, Ann M. Phillips2
1Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Gary Kessler Associates
Ormond Beach, FL
2Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, FL
gck@garykessler.net, ann.phillips@erau.edu
ABSTRACT
Military-grade cryptography has been widely available at no cost for personal and commercial
use since the early 1990s. Since the introduction of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), more and
more people encrypt files and devices, and we are now at the point where our smartphones
are encrypted by default. While this ostensibly provides users with a high degree of privacy,
compelling a user to provide a password has been interpreted by some courts as a violation
of our Fifth Amendment protections, becoming an often insurmountable hurdle to law
enforcement lawfully executing a search warrant. This paper will explore some of the issues
around this complex legal and social issue, including the evolution in the use of digital
cryptography and the evolving legal interpretations of privacy.
Keywords: Cryptography, Fifth Amendment, Law, Passwords, Privacy, Self-incriminating
testimony
1. INTRODUCTION
While addressing cybersecurity conference
attendees at Boston College in 2017, then-
FBI Director James Comey observed that
the ubiquitous availability and use of strong
cryptography was upsetting the delicate bal-
ance between privacy and security that is
at the very heart of the U.S. social contract
(Armerding, 2017). In 2019, Manhattan Dis-
trict Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. testified that
strong iPhone encryption was Apple’s "gift to
sex traffickers" ("Written Testimony", 2019,
para. 13). Today’s digital cryptography truly
is military-grade and provides an often insur-
mountable barrier for law enforcement when
trying to execute a search warrant. This
raises several questions:
1. How do we, as a society, feel about citi-
zens having access to strong encryption
and devices that are impervious to a
government-sanctioned search?
2. Did the authors of the Constitution
envision a container that could never
be opened and, therefore, never be
searched?
3. Is compelling a user to provide a pass-
word a violation of Fifth Amendment
protections?
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4. Should crypto products have backdoors
for just these reasons?
This paper will explore these issues by ex-
amining the growing capabilities of cryptog-
raphy (Section 2) and the evolving interpreta-
tion of privacy and self-incrimination (Section
3). Section 4 will discuss some of the issues
as privacy and the needs of the state collide.
Section 5 will provide some conclusions.
2. SOME MAJOR
EVENTS IN DIGITAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography is the science of writing in se-
cret codes. Most historians point to the use
of non-standard hieroglyphics in Egypt in
1900 B.C.E. as the beginning of secret code
writing although that practice probably ap-
pears spontaneously soon after writing was
developed (Kahn, 1996; Singh, 1999).
For several thousand years, the primary
use of cryptography was for secrecy (aka pri-
vacy and confidentiality). It was also the
exclusive domain of the literate and, even
then, employed almost solely at the nation-
state level to protect diplomatic communica-
tion and military secrets (Kahn, 1996; Singh,
1999).
While many advances in cryptographic
codes appeared in the 1800s, one of the most
notable practical contributions came from
Auguste Kerckhoffs, a Dutch linguist and
cryptographer. In 1883, Kerckhoffs proposed
a number of design principles for military ci-
phers. One that maintains significance today
says that the cryptographic system must not
rely upon the secrecy of the encryption al-
gorithm but upon the judicious choice, use,
and storage of the keys. In fact, it is best to
assume that the enemy knows the algorithm
(Kahn, 1996; Kerckhoffs, 1883a, 1883b).
Cryptography continued to play a major
role in diplomatic and military communica-
tion in the 20th century, playing a key role in
the military campaigns of both World Wars
(Haufler, 2003; Yardley, 1931). Commercial
use of crypto, while introduced in the 1920s,
started to grow so rapidly in the post-WW II
era that the U.S. and most of the allied coun-
tries limited its use by civilians. In the U.S.,
in particular, cryptography was classified as a
munition, which placed strict export controls
on those products (Kahn, 1996; Levy, 2001).
The 1950s saw the dawn of the computer
age in commercial organizations, notably in
the financial industry. In the early 1970s, the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now the
National Institute of Standards and technol-
ogy [NIST]) put out a call for a national stan-
dard encryption scheme for use with comput-
ers. The Data Encryption Standard (DES),
designed by IBM and derived from an earlier
IBM cipher called Lucifer, was adopted in
1977 and published as Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46.
The National Security Agency (NSA) had
input into the development of DES, which
caused many to wonder if they had imple-
mented some sort of backdoor, a purpose-
ful weakening of the algorithm to make is
more susceptible to certain kinds of attack.
Ironically, the NSA-designed Substitution
(S)-boxes removed a mathematical weakness,
making the algorithm stronger. However,
IBM offered both 56- and 128-bit key ver-
sions of DES and the NSA insisted upon use
of the smaller key, making it more susceptible
to brute force attacks (Schneier, 2004).
Upon adoption, DES became the newest
secret key cryptography (SKC) scheme. SKC,
also called symmetric cryptography, uses a
single key for both encryption and decryption.
The key, then, is a shared secret between the
sending and receiving parties. An important
aspect of SKC schemes is the process of key
exchange; specifically, how do the sender and
Page 2 c© 2020 JDFSL
Cryptography JDFSL V15N3
receiver share the key and keep it a secret?
In 1977, the best way might be for one party
to write it down and send it by armored car
to the other party, using the same keys for
days or weeks at a time (Kahn, 1996; Singh,
1999).
During this same era, Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman proposed a new form of
encryption called public key cryptography
(PKC). Also called asymmetric cryptography,
PKC employs two keys, one to encrypt and
the other to decrypt. Although the two keys
are mathematically related and created as a
pair, deriving the value of one of the keys
by knowing the value of the other is compu-
tationally infeasible. Thus, one of the keys
could be widely published and shared, known
as the public key, while the other key re-
mained a closely held private key (Diffie &
Hellman, 1976).
The description of PKC was widely hailed
as the biggest advance in encryption in hun-
dreds of years. For 4,000 years, encryp-
tion was used almost solely to keep secrets.
PKC could also provide sender authentica-
tion, message integrity, key exchange, and
non-repudiation. In terms of key exchange
alone, public key methods allowed secret keys
to be generated and exchanged in millisec-
onds (Kahn, 1996; Levy, 2001).
PKC depends upon the existence of trap-
door functions. In this context, a trapdoor
(as opposed to a backdoor) refers to a math-
ematical function that is easy to compute
but where the inverse function is significantly
harder to calculate; e.g., it is easier to per-
form exponentiation than it is to calculate
logarithms and multiplication is easier than
factorization. The first workable PKC algo-
rithm was published by Rivest, Shamir, and
Adleman (1978) and led to the first commer-
cial PKC product, RSA.
In June 1991, Phil Zimmermann uploaded
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to the Internet.
PGP was the first open cryptosystem, com-
bining hashing, compression, SKC, and PKC
into a method to protect files, devices, and
e-mail. Public keys were shared via a concept
known as a Web of Trust; individuals would
directly exchange their public keyrings and
then share their keyrings with other trusted
parties (Zimmermann, 2001).
PGP secret keys, however, were 128 bits
or larger, making it a strong cryptography
product. Export of strong crypto products
without a license was a violation of Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
and, in fact, Zimmermann was the target
of an FBI investigation from February 1993
to January 1996. Yet, in 1995, perhaps as
a harbinger of the mixed feelings that this
technology engendered, the Electronic Fron-
tier Foundation (EFF) awarded Zimmermann
the Pioneer Award and Newsweek Magazine
named him one of the 50 most influential
people on the Internet (Sussman, 1995; Zim-
mermann, n.d.).
With the commercialization of the Inter-
net and dawning of the World Wide Web
in the early 1990s, the government realized
that there were legitimate needs for public
use of strong cryptography. But not with-
out government oversight. In 1993, at the
same time as the Zimmermann investigation,
NIST and the NSA introduced the Capstone
project to provide strong crypto for public
use. Capstone comprised several components
(Crypto Museum, 2018; Kessler, 2020):
1. Skipjack: An SKC block cipher using an
80-bit key, the design of which was clas-
sified (a violation of Kerckhoffs’ design
principle described above)
2. Clipper: A tamper-proof computer chip
that ran Skipjack, designed with a
government-accessible backdoor
3. Escrowed Encryption Standard (ESS):
A scheme whereby private keys would
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be escrowed by NIST and the Treasury
Dept.
Irrespective of the government’s intentions,
pushback against Capstone from privacy ad-
vocates and critics of its poor cryptographic
practices – including the discovery of a flaw in
the Clipper chip’s law enforcement backdoor
– resulted in the termination of the project by
1996 (Blaze, 1994; Meeks, 1994). Ultimately,
Capstone was never adopted (EPIC, n.d.b).
By 1995, electronic-commerce (e-
commerce) started to blossom on the
Internet. At that time, many people –
including the first author of this paper –
were actually sending credit card numbers
and other private information in unen-
crypted emails. All of this changed in
1995 with Netscape’s release of the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, an encryption
enhancement employed by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in Web servers
and browsers that were fundamental to
supporting the growth of commercial activity
on the Internet. Because export of 128-bit
keys was still prohibited, browsers in this era
– including Internet Explorer and Netscape –
had a domestic version with 128-bit keys and
an international version with 40-bit keys. In
1996, however, President Bill Clinton issued
Executive Order (EO) 13026, re-classifying
crypto products as technology rather than
munition, which greatly relaxed export
controls and key sizes (Clinton, 1996; U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 2000).
While this sea change was ongoing in the
mid-1990s, Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier,
Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener (1996)
released a white paper demonstrating that 56-
bit keys were too short for practical, commer-
cial purposes and that SKC schemes needed
to use longer keys (Figure 1). Given that
DES had had a 20-year lifetime in 1996, they
concluded that the minimum key size for an-
other twenty years was at least 75 bits.
Showing that 56-bit keys were insufficient
was also a harbinger that the useful life of
DES was coming to an end. In March 1998,
NIST reaffirmed the DES standard for use for
one additional five-year cycle but stated that
a new standard would be developed. In July,
however, the EFF introduced Deep Crack, a
chip that could be built for $220K and brute
force a DES key in an average of 4.5 days
(EFF, 1998). This development effectively
killed DES and caused a scramble as interim
fixes and variants to DES became available
(Kessler, 2020).
The process of developing NIST’s next-
generation SKC standard, called the Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES), started
in 1997. The AES process was handled very
differently from the one that gave us DES.
Whereas DES was developed under a shroud
of secrecy, the AES process was an open,
international competition. Fifteen propos-
als were submitted and reviewed, with all
algorithms, documentation, and tests were
posted on a NIST Web site. In 2001, an algo-
rithm named Rijndael (developed by Belgian
cryptographers Joan Daemen and Vincent
Rijmen) – employing a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit
key – was adopted as FIPS Pub. 197 (NIST,
2018).
It is worth noting several other crypto de-
velopments that occurred in the 2000s. Ap-
ple’s Mac OS X, based on the Unix operating
system, became available in 2001 (Painter,
2019). Mac OS X 10.3 (Panther) introduced
FileVault in 2003, which could encrypt a
user’s home directory (Apple Inc., 2003). Fil-
eVault 2, a re-design of the original, was re-
leased in 2011 with Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion)
and supported full startup volume encryp-
tion. This product was one of the first to
employ AES encryption (Apple Inc., 2018;
OSXDaily, n.d.).
In 2004, TrueCrypt, open source encryp-
tion for Windows, MacOS, and Linux, was
released (TrueCrypt, 2015). TrueCrypt pro-
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Figure 1. Effective key lengths for commercial applications (Adapted from Blaze et al., 1996)
vided a novel capability called plausible de-
niability (Figure 2). When a TrueCrypt en-
crypted volume is created, the user can define
a single encrypted container or two encrypted
containers using different passwords. Because
the encrypted volume is randomized, it is
not possible to tell whether there is a single
container or two. If somehow compelled to
provide a password, a user can supply the
password to the standard TrueCrypt volume
and there is no way to know if there is a hid-
den volume within (TrueCrypt Foundation,
2012). (On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt Web
site suddenly went dark, announcing that the
software was no longer being maintained and
that users should seek alternatives. The story
of TrueCrypt and the software that followed
is beyond the scope of this paper but certainly
an interesting twist.)
With the growth in the use of smartphones
and the prodigious amount of personal infor-
mation they contain, default encryption of
these devices was inevitable. In 2014, Ap-
ple announced that iOS 8 devices would be
encrypted by default and Google announced
the same for Android 5.0 (Lollipop) (Miller,
2014).
3. SOME MAJOR
EVENTS IN THE
NOTIONS OF PRIVACY
Although the word "privacy" never appears
in the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights,
Zimmermann – the author of PGP – suggests
that privacy is an inalienable right that was
understood by the framers (1999). Given
the technology available in the late-1780s,
any two people having a conversation knew
whether they had privacy or not simply by
looking around; if a third person came within
earshot, the two people could merely walk
away. The printed word was always visi-
ble. People had privacy because physics sup-
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Figure 2. Plausible deniability in TrueCryp
ported it; the framers would no more discuss
the right of privacy than they would the right
to breathe air.
Most people today associate our expecta-
tion of privacy with the Fourth Amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized (U.S. Const. amend.
IV).
One hundred years after the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution, the invention of the
camera – and an invasive press – brought
the concept of privacy into public discussion.
The right to privacy was first described by
Warren and Brandeis (1890) and introduced
the foundational concept that most Ameri-
cans just want the "right to be let alone."
The Fourth Amendment protects against
overly invasive government searches but also
provides guidelines around when the govern-
ment can access an individual’s personal ef-
fects. In particular, a search is an:
1. Action by the state
2. Infringes upon one’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy
3. Is legal only if there is a search warrant
or a valid warrant exception
In this regard the Fourth Amendment can
be viewed as involving a level of "taking"
some level of privacy by a government entity.
The understanding of Fourth Amendment
protections has changed over time with the
current decisional law suggesting that they
apply to people, not places (Katz v. U.S.,
1967; Olmstead v. U.S., 1928). Katz also
provides a guideline of what "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" means; namely, a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that is objec-
tively reasonable. This standard is met if
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a person expects privacy (subjective) and
society agrees that that expectation is rea-
sonable (objective). As an example, a person
standing inside of an enclosed, glass phone
booth might have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for a telephone conversation but
probably does not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy if they are taking their clothes
off.
The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA, 1986), which governs electronic
surveillance in the United States, has always
drawn a distinction between user data and
transactional data. User data, also called
content, is the information that is under di-
rect control of the user, such as the words
typed into a file or words said during a tele-
phone conversation. Transactional data, also
called non-content, is the metadata needed by
an entity such as a communications carrier,
file system, or operating system to actually
control or manage the data flow. The dis-
tinction between user content and metadata
is consistent with the established legal doc-
trines regarding the privacy of content and
the sharing of date under the third-party doc-
trine. By refusing to include content in the
electronic surveillance data, the traditional
Katz doctrine is being followed. Similarly, al-
lowing metadata to be included in electronic
surveillance comports with the third-party
doctrine.
The third-party doctrine emanated from
Smith v. Maryland (1979). In this case,
Smith stole a woman’s purse. A few days
later, the woman started to receive harass-
ing phone calls. Following the procedures of
the ECPA, police placed a trap and trace
device on her line to determine the numbers
calling the woman; this process linked calls
to Smith’s number. Again, following ECPA
provisions, police placed a pen register on
Smith’s line, showing that he was calling the
woman. Smith was arrested, tried, and con-
victed. He appealed the conviction by assert-
ing his expectation that his telephone calls
were private. The Court upheld conviction,
noting that a) police did not view the content
of his calls and b) he had already shared the
fact that he was calling the woman with a
third party, namely the telephone company.
These points are important to this discus-
sion largely because metadata is typically
not encrypted while content might be. Thus,
metadata would seemingly always be avail-
able to law enforcement; it is content where
the issue of encryption might be directly at
issue. And content is where incriminating
and exculpatory evidence of crime would be
found.
The Fifth Amendment addresses,
among other things, issues related to
self-incriminating testimony and says, in
part, "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself"
(U.S. Const. amend. V). This concept was
novel at the time because the prevailing
jurisprudence in the 1700s was that a suspect
was guilty until proven innocent. The U.S.
system of criminal justice is based upon the
notion that a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty and the state has the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this way, the Fifth Amendment can be
seen as protecting against a person having to
"give" evidence. Not forcing a defendant to
testify is a way of implementing this precept;
a criminal suspect does not have to speak
and not speaking is not an implication of
guilt.
Fisher v. U.S. (1976) introduced two rele-
vant clarifications to Fifth Amendment pro-
tections, namely the Act of Production Doc-
trine and the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine.
The Act of Production Doctrine says that a
compelled act is testimonial when the act as-
serts information – i.e., the contents of one’s
mind – with some aspect of communication.
In this case, the Court observed that doing
something can convey information the same
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as saying something. Thus, if a teacher asks
a group of students to raise their hands if
they read a certain paper, the act of raising
the hand is testimonial since it conveys infor-
mation that is in the students’ heads. Courts
have, therefore, come to interpret the Fifth
Amendment as protecting both forms of com-
pulsion, namely, testimony and production.
It is important to note that knowing a
password and knowing the contents of an
encrypted device are two different things. It
is often the case people besides the owner of
a device may know or be aware of the code
needed to unlock the device; family members
and friends, for example, often exchange or
share this information for myriad reasons.
Therefore, knowledge of a password is not a
valid test that the person actually knows the
contents and, therefore, is not in and of itself
incriminating.
The Act of Production Doctrine considers
a person’s communication implicit in the act,
not what communications may result from
the act. How incriminating the production
may be, or what the computer does when a
person unlocks is, does not change the testi-
mony implicit in the act of unlocking it. In
re Search Warrant Application (2017) notes
that use of biometry to access a device does
not gain testimonial significance based on
the information revealed; such an argument
"...relies on conflating what it means for an
act to be inherently testimonial versus an act
yielding an incriminating result" (Section II,
para. 11). In a sense, the passcode is akin to
a fingerprint or a physical key; it can be used
to open the device to further exploration, but
neither the code nor the fingerprint nor the
physical key creates any information to be
decrypted; the information either exists or it
doesn’t irrespective of the unlocking of the
device. Thinking of the issue in this regard
overcomes the dichotomy of being able to
use a fingerprint to unlock a device, but not
obtain a passcode.
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine says
that compelling a person to produce informa-
tion under certain circumstances is not tes-
timonial if the state already, independently
knows that the person has the information.
So, as an example, if the state compels a per-
son to open a safe by using a combination,
the act of entering the correct combination is
not incriminating testimony that the person
knows the combination if the state can show
that it had authentic, a priori knowledge
that the person knew the combination. The
elements of the Forgone Conclusion Doctrine
are met when:
1. The state has knowledge of the exis-
tence in some specified location of the
demanded evidence (reasonable particu-
larity)
2. The person is known to have possessed
or controlled the evidence
3. The evidence is authentic
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine has two
elements that apply more to the access to and
acceptance of physical documents than to dig-
ital passwords. Reasonable particularity, the
first such element, is a level of specificity that
does not really apply to passwords; the state
is seeking a single password with which to ac-
cess a single device (Commonwealth v. Jones,
2019; Kerr, 2018; U.S. v. Spencer, 2018).
The other element, authenticity, should not
be an issue with passwords since they are
self-authenticating; if the password works, it
is clearly authentic (Commonwealth v. Gelf-
gatt, 2014; In the Matter of the Search, 2018;
State of Florida v. Stahl, 2016).
Doe v. U.S. (1988) provides additional in-
sight into when Fifth Amendment protections
attach. According to Doe, "...an accused’s
communication must itself, explicitly or im-
plicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information" (Doe, para. 3) in order to be
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considered testimonial. Thus, Fifth Amend-
ment privileges can only be invoked when
these three elements apply:
1. Compulsion
2. Testimonial communication or act
3. Incrimination
Without these components, there is no
Fifth Amendment issue. Per Doe (1988),
"If a compelled statement is ’not testimonial
and for that reason not protected by the priv-
ilege, it cannot become so because it will
lead to incriminating evidence’" (footnote 6).
This relates to the question about whether
providing a passcode is testimonial. If the ini-
tial compelled communication is testimonial,
then any derivative evidence would be inad-
missible; if, however, such information is not
testimonial, then any derivative information
would be properly admitted into evidence.
U.S. v. Hubbell (2000) further clarifies
the limits of the Fifth Amendment. As part
of a plea agreement, Hubbell agreed to pro-
vide certain documents relevant to a govern-
ment investigation. After the government is-
sued a subpoena to Hubbell to produce those
documents, he asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination be-
fore a Grand Jury. The prosecutor obtained
a court order for the documents and of-
fered immunity to Hubbell who, in turn, pro-
vided the documents, thus was in compli-
ance with the original plea bargain. The gov-
ernment then used the documents to indict
Hubbell for additional crimes. The Supreme
Court dismissed the indictment, observing
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination protects an individual from
being compelled to disclose the existence
of, much less produce, incriminating doc-
uments of which the prosecution has no a
priori knowledge, thus is unable to describe
with reasonable particularity. The Court also
ruled that if an individual produces such doc-
uments pursuant to a grant of immunity, the
government may not use them to pursue ad-
ditional criminal charges against that person.
4. PRIVACY V. THE
NEEDS OF THE STATE
The evolution and widespread availability of
strong cryptography made it inevitable that
an individual’s expectation of privacy would
be on a collision course with the legitimate
needs of the state to execute a valid search
warrant.
4.1 Compelling an Individual’s
Password
Since the early days of PGP, everyone from
pundits and researchers to legal scholars and
technocrats have wondered, "What happens
if law enforcement issues a search warrant
for an encrypted device and the user chooses
not to comply?" It took more than 15 years
for a court case to address this question
(Nakashima, 2008).
U.S. v. Boucher (2007, 2009) is the first
known case in the U.S. involving an en-
crypted computer and the question of self-
incrimination. Boucher, a Canadian citizen,
was stopped at a U.S. border crossing in Ver-
mont. Upon examination, images of child
pornography were found on his computer,
which was encrypted using PGP Desktop
software. The computer was powered down
upon seizure and was unable to be further ex-
amined by law enforcement (Cohen & Park,
2018; Nakashima, 2008; Sacharoff, 2018). Po-
lice then asked a judge to compel Boucher to
provide the password. In 2007, a U.S. Magis-
trate Judge ruled that compelling a password
violated Boucher’s Fifth Amendment protec-
tions against self-incrimination. Upon the
government’s appeal in 2009, a U.S. District
Judge ordered Boucher to supply police with
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an unencrypted version of the hard drive. At
that point, Boucher accepted a plea agree-
ment, was sentenced to three years in prison,
and then subsequently deported.
During public discourse of the various
Boucher rulings, many physical world analo-
gies were made to this cyber world case. Most
notably, the password was the same as a key
to a locked room; providing the key is not
incriminating even if the contents of the room
are. But, in light of the Act of Production
Doctrine, is revealing the key’s location tes-
timonial? One can be compelled to give a
fingerprint, cheek swab, hair sample, blood,
or other DNA; why not a password? But,
perhaps a more fundamental question: Did
the framers of the Constitution in 1878 ever
conceive of a Fourth Amendment container
that could not somehow be opened by physi-
cal means?
When applying for search warrants for
physical documents, the government needs to
meet the constitutional threshold of proba-
ble cause, i.e., that there is a fair probability
that a search will result in evidence of a crime
being discovered (U.S. Const. amend. IV).
The government must also, as specific as is
possible, describe the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized. The
standard for searching for data on a digital
device should not be higher. The standard
for compelling the production of a password
does not have to do with the eventual re-
covery of evidence. Rather, as some courts
have held, the proper question is whether
the government can demonstrate that it is a
foregone conclusion that the defendant can
decrypt the device (Kerr, 2018, 2019; U.S. v.
Apple MacPro Computer, 2017).
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine was sig-
nificant in the Boucher Order. Boucher ac-
cessed his laptop at the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent’s request
at the border, where the agent ascertained
the presence of child pornography. Because
of that act, the Government knew of the ex-
istence and location of the hard drive and its
files. Compelling Boucher to provide access
to the unencrypted drive did not add to the
sum total of the Government’s information
about the presence of possibly incriminat-
ing files (Kerr, 2019; Sacharoff, 2018; U.S. v.
Boucher, 2009).
In addition, Boucher’s act of producing
an unencrypted version of the drive was not
needed to authenticate it since he had already
admitted to possession of the computer and
provided the Government access to the drive.
Since the Government could link Boucher
with the files on his computer without mak-
ing use of his production of an unencrypted
version of the drive and stated that it would
not use his act of production as evidence of
authentication, there was no violation of his
Fifth Amendment privileges (Kerr, 2018; U.S.
v. Boucher, 2009).
The Boucher case did not provide guidance
necessarily followed by other courts. In a
similar case five years later in Massachusetts,
suspect Gelfgatt was charged with multiple
counts of forgery. Relevant evidence was
known to be on his computers. Prior to
trial, a motion to compel Gelfgatt to "...en-
ter his password into encryption software"
was denied by a Superior Court judge, who
referred the point of law to the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court (SJC). The SJC reversed the
denial, arguing that the motion violated nei-
ther the Fifth Amendment nor Article 12 of
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights since
the compelled decryption would not commu-
nicate facts of a testimonial nature beyond
what Gelfgatt had already admitted to inves-
tigators (Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 2014).
Yet, five years after that, the state issued
a Gelfgatt order for Jones – indicted for sex
trafficking – to "provide... in writing... the
PIN code" to a mobile phone (Commonwealth
v. Jones, 2019). But entering and revealing
a password are different things, and revealing
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the password is not supported by Gelfgatt.
Once the Commonwealth changed the request
to entering the password, the order was up-
held due to the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
(Kerr, 2019).
Requiring the disclosure of a password
can be compared to the required disclosure
of a private document, which may have
some Fifth Amendment protection. The re-
quired oral disclosure of a password is often
equated to incriminating testimony which is
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment (Kerr,
2019).
Inconsistencies in rulings have appeared
within states and between federal courts.
Two cases in Florida provide a classic ex-
ample. In State of Florida v. Stahl (2016),
Stahl was arrested for video voyeurism (in
this case, taking upskirt photos) in Sarasota.
Stahl gave consent for the search of his mobile
phone, confirmed the phone number, and pro-
vided police with the location of the phone –
and then withdrew consent. The State’s mo-
tion to compel Stahl to provide the password
to police officers was denied by the trial judge,
yet Florida’s Second District appellate court
quashed the trial judge’s order, allowing the
State to compel the password (Kerr, 2019).
In 2018, G.A.Q.L., a 17-year-old, was an
inebriated driver in a high-speed collision in
the southeastern part of the state, resulting
in the death of a passenger in his vehicle
(G.A.Q.L. v. State of Florida, 2018). The
State made a motion to compel an iPhone
7 and iTunes password pursuant to a search
warrant for the phone, for which they had
credible belief that relevant evidence would
be found. The trial court ordered the pass-
words to be provided, per Stahl. In this
case, Florida’s Fourth District appellate court
quashed the trial judge’s order, protecting
the password on Fifth Amendment grounds.
The appellate judges ruled that the Foregone
Conclusion Doctrine did not apply because
the State did not show "reasonable particu-
larity."
Given that two Florida appellate courts
have made different rulings, this question
will likely go to the Florida Supreme Court
at some point. The Court in G.A.Q.L.
openly disagreed with Florida’s Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal and cited a U.S. 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals case that found that
the privilege against compelled decryption ap-
plies unless the government can describe the
incriminating files that are on the device with
reasonable particularity (In Re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 2012).
There are other cases that have resulted
in conflicting decisions, showing that there is
no clear precedent, among them:
1. U.S. v. Fricosu (2012): Citing the All
Writs Act, ordered the defendant to sup-
ply an unencrypted copy of an encrypted
hard drive for which the Government
had a search warrant.
2. U.S. v. Apple MacPro Computer (2017):
Found that compelled decryption did
not violate prior decisional law and did
not violate Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
3. U.S. v. Spencer (2018): Held that the
appropriate test to determine whether
the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine ap-
plied was whether the government could
show that it was a foregone conclusion
that the defendant could decrypt the
devices; if so, it allowed compelled de-
cryption.
4. Seo v. State (2018): Found that ordering
the defendant to unlock a mobile phone
was a violation of Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination,
largely because of the unlimited nature
of the search warrant and the fact that
the device is an intimate record of a
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person’s thoughts and actions. The rul-
ing was upheld by the Indiana Supreme
Court in 2020 (Lee, 2020; Seo v. State,
2020).
It seems that inconsistencies at the Federal
level (e.g., Boucher, in the U.S. 2nd Circuit,
conflicts with In Re Grand Jury Subpoena,
decided in the U.S. 11th Circuit) suggest
that this issue has to eventually be adju-
dicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. One
could argue that the Supreme Court has al-
ready missed one opportunity to address this
question. The defendant in Commonwealth v.
Jones (2019) filed a writ of certiorari with the
Court in 2019 (Reidy & Nathanson, 2019).
The specific questions in the writ were:
Does the Fifth Amendment’s act of produc-
tion doctrine apply to compelled decryption?
If so, what does the foregone conclusion ex-
ception to the act of production doctrine re-
quire the government to show before an order
to compel decryption can issue? (Reidy &
Nathanson, p. i)
Public defenders in Massachusetts filed an
amicus curiae brief arguing that Fisher’s rul-
ing regarding the Act of Production Doctrine
should not be applied to compelled decryp-
tion (Rangaviz, 2019). The Supreme Court
declined to hear the case as they denied cer-
tiorari (U.S. Supreme Court, 2019).
4.2 Product and Encryption
Backdoors
In December 2015, a mass shooting in San
Bernardino, California resulted in 14 peo-
ple being killed and an additional 21 people
wounded. The shooters – a married couple
– were both killed in a shootout with police.
According to FBI investigators, the couple
were lone operator terrorists; "homegrown
violent extremists" radicalized over several
years of consuming "poison on the Internet"
and inspired by foreign terrorist groups com-
mitted to jihadism and martyrdom, yet not
directed by any particular group (Schmidt &
Pérez-Peña, 2015).
The FBI believed that access to the iPhone
5C found in the couple’s vehicle would ad-
vance their investigation. As iPhone encryp-
tion has evolved, law enforcement has re-
quested assistance from Apple many times to
retrieve information so as to advance crim-
inal investigations. When Apple complied,
it employed existing capabilities to access
the devices (Cohen & Park, 2018; Sacharoff,
2018).
In 2016, the Court issued an order requir-
ing a custom operating system be created and
installed by Apple without unlocking or oth-
erwise changing the data on the phone (In re
Apple AWA Order, 2016). What was new in
this request was that Apple was asked to de-
velop a new capability to break the advanced
security features found in Apple’s devices.
The basis of the FBI’s request to Apple was
the All Writs Act of 1789 that allows the gov-
ernment to issue all necessary and appropri-
ate orders in the furtherance of their rightful
duties (In re Apple AWA Application, 2016).
Apple opposed the order on the grounds that
it was unlawful and unconstitutional because
it essentially conscripted Apple into writing
hacking code for the government. Further,
they argued that if the order was granted,
it would undermine the security of all Apple
devices and set a dangerous precedent for fu-
ture cases (Cohen & Park, 2018; EPIC, n.d.a;
In re Apple Motion to Vacate, 2016). Subse-
quently, the FBI found another way into the
phone and the matter was dropped (Blum,
2018; Cardozo & Crocker, 2018).
In December 2019, conflicts between the
government and Apple resurfaced after a ter-
rorist shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola
(Florida). A member of the Saudi Arabian
military in flight training at the air station,
later found to have ties with al Qaeda, killed
three people and wounded eight others with
a handgun before being killed by responding
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authorities. Law enforcement wanted to gain
access to two of the assailant’s phones, an
iPhone 5 and iPhone 7. Attorney General
William Barr requested Apple’s assistance
in unlocking the phones and Apple, as in
the past, refused the government’s request.
A.G. Barr was very public in his displeasure
that Apple would not assist in this case while
Apple made it clear that they had assisted
the government in substantive ways, includ-
ing responding rapidly to their requests and
turning over several terabytes of data; Apple
merely would not unlock the phones (Feiner,
2020; Lucas, 2020). Eventually, the FBI was
able to break into the phones and although
they opined that Apple’s assistance earlier on
would have been helpful, they did not address
what new type of information was recovered
(Brewster, 2020).
In early 2020, the U.S. Senate introduced
the Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Ne-
glect of Interactive Technologies (EARN IT)
Act of 2020. While the umbrella mission "To
establish a National Commission on Online
Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention..." is
noble, the Trump Administration’s publicly
stated rationale is because child predators
use virtually unbreakable encryption (S.3398,
2020). Of course, so do terrorists and crimi-
nals, as well as journalists, political activists,
victims of domestic abuse, and other ordinary
citizens. While the EARN IT Act does not
specifically address encryption, it provides a
clear path for the government to force con-
tent platforms to eliminate its use (Newman,
2020; Pfefferkorn, 2020).
Section 230 of the Communications De-
cency Act (CDA) holds Internet social media
services, such as Facebook and Twitter, im-
mune from liability for the content on their
unmoderated platforms. Thus, if Party A de-
fames Party B on Facebook or Twitter, Party
B can sue Party A but cannot sue Facebook
or Twitter (47 U.S. Code §?230, 1996). With-
out Section 230 protections, it is unlikely that
social media platforms would exist as they
do today (for good or for bad).
The EARN IT Act would remove Section
230 immunity unless social media and other
content-hosting platforms comply with a set
of guidelines that would be created by an
unelected National Commission and could be
changed unilaterally at the whim of the U.S.
Attorney General. Furthermore, these guide-
lines are not laws or rules that go through
any legislative or formal rulemaking process,
although compliance with them provides im-
munity to the provider (Pfefferkorn, 2020).
Clearly, this approach provides a way to
incent – or coerce – platforms to do what
the Government wants them to do (Cope,
Mackey, & Crocker, 2020).
A threat to the use of end-to-end encryp-
tion is not explicit in the EARN IT Act; in
fact, the only mention of the word "cryptog-
raphy" is to require that two members of
the National Commission be knowledgeable
about the subject (S.3398, 2020). But the
potential is there for the commission to de-
cide to limit the immunity of a platform that
employs end-to-end encryption (Pfefferkorn,
2020). It might also require content providers
to examine the content being posted, which
would not only bypass the use of encryption
but would also make the content provider
an agent of the state without a search war-
rant (Cope et al., 2020). At the time of this
paper’s submission, the bill is under consid-
eration by the Senate (Ng, 2020).
5. CONCLUSION
Even before the shooting in Pensacola, the
Apple-FBI conflict had re-energized the de-
bate about the government’s need and ability
to get past strong encryption. Once again,
discussion started about requiring manufac-
turers to install backdoors in all encryption
products or on ways to ban end-to-end en-
cryption. While this is an idea that might
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sound good on paper – as it did two decades
earlier – it is impossible to implement cryp-
tographic backdoors without weakening the
overall security of any product (Abelson et
al., 2015). Many practical issues crop up, as
well, including (Claburn, 2019):
1. Who determines who the Good Guys are
that get access to the backdoor features?
2. How would use of the backdoor be con-
trolled?
3. How would access to the backdoor ever
be rescinded?
But is this not the same idea that the gov-
ernment posed – and the marketplace rejected
– in the 1990s with Capstone (IEEE, 2018;
Stepanovich & Karanicolas, 2018; Young &
Yung, 1996)? And, yet, it seems to remain
an attractive idea to governments; as recently
as June 2019, senior members of the Trump
administration were exploring potential leg-
islation to crack down on end-to-end encryp-
tion (Abel, 2019; Claburn, 2019). Indeed,
U.S. Attorney General William Barr and offi-
cials in Australia and the U.K. have warned
high-tech companies that continued use of
strong end-to-end encryption could result in
stronger regulations and laws limiting such
use ("Attorney General", 2019). Interest-
ingly, the European Union Agency for Cy-
bersecurity (ENISA) and Europol released
a joint statement in 2016 calling for mecha-
nisms to circumvent commercial encryption
methods although they acknowledged that
weakened cryptography was not the correct
forward path ("On lawful", 2016).
A cryptographic backdoor is a slight vari-
ant on kleptography, the "...study of steal-
ing information securely and subliminally"
(Young & Yung, 1997, p. 63). Unlike a
backdoor that weakens a crypto algorithm,
kleptography refers to an attack on a cryp-
tosystem from within. Consider this exam-
ple: Imagine a trusted, black box cryptosys-
tem that generates PKC key pairs. Presum-
ably, the private key cannot be derived from
the widely-distributed public key. Suppose
that a trapdoor function – called a Secretly
Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protec-
tion (SETUP) – is embedded into the cryp-
tosystem that allowed an attacker to access
or derive the private key from the public
key by weakening the key generation pro-
cess (Esslinger, 2013; Young & Yung, 1996,
1997). For a practical application of klep-
tography, consider Edwards Snowden’s rev-
elation in 2013 that the NSA deliberately
weakened NIST pseudo-random number gen-
erator (PRNG) standards, the methods at
the very heart of generating secret keys and
public key pairs (Zetter, 2013).
This paper poses several questions about
reconciling personal privacy with the legiti-
mate needs of the state to conduct investiga-
tions. This paper is not intended to answer
those questions but to inform the debate.
Other related questions might include:
1. Were any of us – as citizens and con-
sumers – ever asked what we wanted, in
terms of strong encryption?
2. Is the need for an individual’s personal
privacy superior to the State’s need to
investigate crimes?
3. Do we alter the government’s duty to
provide security with the implementa-
tion of processes that could block tools
used to reach that objective?
4. Is the subjective expectation of privacy
when using encryption so absolute that it
meets the "objectively reasonable" test?
In particular, does society agree?
5. How did we manage for the last 230 years
without this level of protection from the
State?
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6. Who gave Apple, Google, et al. the right
to have unilaterally made the decision
about use of strong cryptography with-
out an informed debate?
7. How do we resolve conflicts between the
protections of two amendments?
The evolution of technology has always
moved faster than the legislative process and
the fact that both use a different vernacular
does not help in the mutual understanding
necessary for the implementation of good
laws and regulations (Kessler, 1999). Society,
however, cannot address these questions if
we are not having the discussion. We cannot
move forward toward any type of solution if
the various stakeholders continue to hold on
to decades-old arguments; our way of think-
ing about this topic must evolve since neither
technology nor the law can afford to stand
still.
In June 2020, the Lawful Access to En-
crypted Data (LAED) Act was introduced in
the U.S. Senate (Bradbury, 2020; Committee
on the Judiciary, 2020; Franceschi-Bicchierai,
2020; S.4051, 2020). Legislators are again
insisting that technology companies insert
cryptographic backdoors into their products
and requires similar backdoors in any plat-
form supporting end-to-end encryption, so
that they can comply with search warrants.
The debate continues.
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Privacy issues and the law Timeline Issues and events
2600 BCE Writing appears
1900 BCE Secret writing appears
U.S. Constitution ratified 1789
Bill of Rights ratified 1791
"The Right to Privacy" 1890
1914-1918 Cryptography in WW I
Olmstead v. U.S. 1928
1939-1945 Cryptography in WW II
1948 Cryptography classified as a munition
Katz v. U.S. 1967
1969 Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET)
Fisher v. U.S. 1976 PKC concept described
1977 DES released
1978 RSA described
Smith v. Maryland 1979
1985 National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET)
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986
Doe v. U.S. 1988
1991 PGP released on the Internet
Commercialization of the Internet
1993 FBI starts Zimmermann investigation
Capstone program proposed
1995 Zimmermann receives EFF Pioneer Award
SSL introduced
1996 FBI closes Zimmermann investigation
Capstone project dead
EO 13026 released
Blaze et al.: "56-bit keys are dead"
1997 NIST starts AES process
"Kleptography" defined
1998 EFF Deep Crack chip: "DES is dead"
U.S. v. Hubbell 2000 Commerce Dept. reclassifies cryptography
2001 AES adopted
2003 FileVault (home directory) released
2004 TrueCrypt and plausible deniability released
U.S. v. Boucher 2009
2011 FileVault 2 (full volume) released
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena U.S. v. Fricosu 2012
2013 Snowden revelations about NSA
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt 2014 Android 5.0 introduces default encryption
Apple iOS 8 introduces default encryption
2015 San Bernardino terrorist shooting
State of Florida v. Stahl 2016 FBI versus Apple
U.S. v. Apple MacPro Computer 2017 Crypto backdoors back in public discussion
G.A.Q.L. v. State of Florida 2018
U.S. v. Spencer
Seo v. State
Commonwealth v. Jones 2019 NAS Pensacola terrorist shooting
SCOTUS denies certiorari in Jones
EARN IT Act introduced in U.S. Senate 2020
LAED Act introduced in U.S. Senate
Seo v. State upheld
Table 1. Timeline
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